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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. The wife, Respondent in this 
appeal, filed a Complaint against her husband, the Appellant. 
She sought, among other things, an equitable distribution of the 
marital assets and debts, alimony, and attorney's fees. The 
husband counterclaimed and asked for, among other things, an 
equitable distribution of the real and personal property and 
debts of the marriage. 
The case was tried to the Honorable Rodney S. Page. Each 
side was represented by counsel and presented documentary evi-
dence, their own testimony, and testimony of third parties. The 
trial court took the matter under advisement and filed a Memor-
andum Decision on September 4, 1984. A Decree reflecting that 
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decision was entered on November 14, 1984. Itf in part, awarded 
both parties a divorce, gave the wife alimony for a limited 
period of time, awarded her a portion of the attorney's fees 
requested, and distributed various items of personal and real 
property to the parties. No post-trial motions were filed, nor 
did the Appellant object to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, or Decree of Divorce. 
The husband filed a Notice of Appeal on November 21, 1984. 
The wife has not cross-appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because Appellant's Statement of Facts fails to mention 
certain facts which Respondent believes to be significant to the 
determination of this appeal, she wishes to supplement and 
clarify that Statement of Facts as follows. 
This was a fifteen-year marriage (TR-5). In December of 
1983, Respondent testified that her husband had threatened to 
shoot her (TR-7) and, consequently, she was required to secure a 
Temporary Restraining Order against him removing him from the 
marital residence (R-50). When the Temporary Restraining Order 
was heard, the parties agreed that it could be made permanent 
(R-15) and the court allowed Respondent to stay in the home 
(R-56). She has continuously resided theire since 1968. She 
worked all but eight months of the marriage (TR-10). 
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Both parties brought homes into the marriage (TR-9, 113), 
Appellant did not want to reside in Respondent's home (TR-61) 
and, therefore, it was rented and ultimately sold (TR-9). That 
sale generated a profit of $6,600.00 which was placed in a joint 
savings account (TR-9), along with Respondent's child support 
from a previous marriage and portions of her salary (TR-10, 13). 
The Court received an appraisal of Appellant's home valuing 
it at the time of the marriage at $17,650.00 (Exhibit 1, TR-113). 
The mortgage balance at that time was $14,981.37 (TR-12). In 
1973 the parties' joint savings account described above was used 
to pay off the entire mortgage on the marital residence (TR-9). 
Both parties worked throughout the marriage. At the time of 
trial, Appellant was a foreman for Lone Star Industries and was 
earning $3,000.00 per month gross and $2,018.00 per month net 
(Exhibit D-4). He started the job fourteen years ago (TR-66>. 
In 1983 he made $42,761.00 (Exhibit P-13) and as of August 15, 
1984, had earned $28,478.00 (TR-64, R-179). Respondent works for 
Forrest's Concrete Pumping as a dispatcher and bookkeeper 
(TR-33). She grosses $1,200.00 per month and nets $953.00 per 
month (TR-12, Exhibit D-4). In 1983 she made 510,928.81 (R-73, 
Exhibit P-12). She has no other sources of income (TR-33). Her 
salary will not qualify her for any long term financing (TR-11). 
In connection with his employment, a retirement fund and a 
profit sharing plan was established for Appellant. As of the 
trial, the balance in the profit sharing stock option plan was 
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$27,196.00 (R-94, 178). He also has a retirement fund which he 
acknowledged as an asset of the marriage (Exhibit D-2), but 
claimed it had no value. Mr. Rob Roy, an actuarial expert called 
by Mrs. Talley, reviewed Appellant's retirement fund documents 
and concluded that that fund had a present value of $30,040.93 
(TR-74-76). A letter from Mr. Roy documented that conclusion 
(Exhibit P-17) and was received into evidence (TR-75). Mr. 
Talley also had $7,114.58 in an I.R.A. (Exhibit P-9). That 
account was awarded to him (R-164). Other than $9,250.20 in her 
I.R.A., Mrs. Talley has no pension plan (TR-23). 
Respondent introduced and testified about several exhibits 
which described the marital assets, including the furniture 
(Exhibits P-3, 4 and 5), the penny stocks (Exhibit P-6), the home 
(Exhibits P-l and 2), the automobiles, the boat, the silver, the 
bank accounts, the Merrill Lynch account, the I.R.A.'s, and the 
retirement and profit sharing plans (Exhibit P-9). Appellant 
testified as to some of these, but notably did not mention the 
penny stocks, his guns and sporting goods, and the ESOP stock. 
In fact, the only evidence on those assets was provided by 
Respondent (TR-19, Exhibits P-6 and 9) . 
In addition, Respondent testified as to the furniture she 
brought into the marriage (TR-14 and Exhibit P-3) and that Appel-
lant had taken property with him when he vacated the residence 
(TR-17). At the time of separation, the parties had a bank 
account of $20,445.00 and two days after service of the Temporary 
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Restraining Order Appellant removed $6,000.00 from that account 
(TR-23). 
The monthly expenses of Respondent (Exhibit P-8) were based 
on her average expenditures after reviewing her cancelled checks 
(TR-30). Appellant did not present evidence as to his monthly 
expenses and admitted giving his daughter substantial sums from 
his earnings since the parties1 separation (TR-126, 129). In 
fact, he admitted having extra money for investments he made 
after separation (TR-132). 
In Mr. Talleyfs Statement of Facts, he concludes that the 
trial court should not have divided the assets equally between 
the parties. This position is directly contrary to his testimony 
where on several occasions he stated that all he wanted was a 
fifty/fifty distribution (TR-116, 121, 139; Exhibits D-3, 5). 
Finally, it is important to note that the trial court's 
Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(copies are included in the Addendum to this Brief) specifically 
set forth the values of the property (R-177, 178) (values now 
disputed by Appellant) and yet Appellant filed no objections to 
those findings, approved the same (R-183, 188), and made no 
motions for a new trial or to amend the Decree. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
A decision of a trial court in a divorce action should not 
be disturbed unless there is a clear showing of a misapplication 
of the law or an abuse of discretion resulting in a substantial 
error or a serious inequity. Appellant has not shown that the 
trial court in this matter misapplied the law or abused its 
discretion on either the support or property distribution issues. 
POINT II 
The trial court's method of valuing the property of the 
parties was proper and supported by credible evidence. Mr. 
Talley did not contradict the evidence presented by Mrs. Talley 
and an expert witness concerning the value of Appellant's retire-
ment fund and the penny stocks and ESOP stocks. The trial court 
carefully weighed the evidence presented by both parties con-
cerning the value of the parties1 boat, the value of the home 
furnishings, and the contributions of the parties to the marital 
home. It fulfilled its role as the fact finder and then deter-
mined the values of these properties and then made a fair and 
equitable property distribution. Each award to one party was 
balanced by an award to the other based upon the values found by 
the court and each consequently received an award of one-half of 
the marital assets. 
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POINT III 
Under the circumstances, the trial courtfs award of alimony 
was proper. From testimony provided by Appellant and Respondent, 
the trial court found that Mr. Talley netted twice as much as 
Mrs. Talley and that she needed support. She asked for permanent 
alimony of $500.00 per month and received only $250.00 per month 
for two years and $150.00 per month for three years, with the 
alimony payment to then terminate. The length of the marriage 
(fourteen years), the disparity of income ($2,018 per month 
versus $952 per month), and the monthly needs of Mrs. Talley 
clearly support the award made. 
POINT IV 
The trial courtfs award of less than half of Respondent's 
attorney's fees was supported by credible evidence and at no time 
during the lower court proceeding did Appellant object to that 
award of fees. Not only was the award proper, but Appellant is 
not entitled to raise an issue before this Court which was not 
raised in the trial court proceedings. 
POINT V 
Because Appellant's claims are without merit and Respondent 
has been required to defend this appeal, she should be awarded 
her attorney's fees and costs in connection with this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN A DIVORCE ACTION 
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS THERE IS A CLEAR SHOWING 
OF A MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRE-
TION RESULTING IN A SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR A SERIOUS 
INEQUITY. 
The Appellant, Mr. Talley, contends that the trial court 
erred in its award of alimony and inequitably allocated marital 
property and, consequently, abused the wide discretion afforded 
it in making such a property distribution and support award. The 
evidence presented to the trial court clearly shows that this was 
just not the case. 
In order to prevail on this appeal, Appellant is required to 
show that the trial court, in making its support award or distri-
bution of property, misunderstood or misapplied the law, entered 
findings not supported by the evidence, or caused a serious 
inequity so as to constitute an abuse of discretion. See English 
v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah, 1977). As was clearly 
stated in Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1974): 
Although it is both the duty and prerogative of this 
court in a case of equity to review the facts as well 
as the law, Article 8, Section 9, Constitution of Utah, 
the trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion 
in adjusting the financial and property interests in a 
divorce case. The actions of the trial court are 
indulged with the presumption of validity, and the 
burden is on appellant to prove such a serious inequity 
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion [footnote]. 
There is no fixed formula for the division of property; 
§30-3-5 U.C.A. (1953) provides that when a decree of 
divorce is made the court may make such orders in 
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relation to property as may be equitable, [footnote] 
Id. at 700. 
Mr. Talley's burden is not an easy one and the record does not 
show any inequity which would constitute an abuse of discretion 
by the trial court. As was stated in Bader v. Bader, 18 Utah 2d 
407, 424 P.2d 190 (1967): 
It would lead to intolerable instability of judgments 
if this court should assume the prerogative and accept 
the responsibility of merely second guessing a trial 
judge who has done a conscientious job of attempting to 
make just and equitable allocation of the property and 
income of the parties in regard to alimony and support 
monies as the trial judge appears to have done here. 
It is due to this fact, taking into consideration the 
nature of the trial judgefs authority and duty, and his 
advantaged position, that in such matters he is allowed 
a comparatively wide latitude of discretion which will 
not be disturbed in the absence of clear abuse . . . 
Id. at 151. 
After a complete trial and the receipt of thirty-three 
exhibits, the trial judge properly weighed all of the factors 
related to this case and fashioned a remedy that would be as fair 
as possible to both parties under the circumstances of this case. 
The Memorandum Decision of the trial court has all the earmarks 
of a fair and final effort to adjust all doubtful equities so as 
to not harm either party (see Addendum). Because Mr. Talley 
appears to be dissatisfied with only certain aspects of the trial 
court's decision, he has now requested this Court to substitute 
its judgment for that of the trial court. That request would is 
an invasion of the trial court's function as the fact finder and 
fashioner of equitable remedies. 
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As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to set the record 
straight regarding certain claims of Appellant that the trial 
court did not properly consider the value of the property it 
distributed. Evidence was presented by both side (documents and 
testimony) pertaining to the value of the property in issue (the 
house, the boat, the automobiles, the furniture, the stock, the 
bank accounts, and the retirement accounts). The trial court, in 
reaching its final decision, considered all of the evidence 
presented to it in determining what indeed was fact. It is not a 
proper approach, as Appellant would urge, to conclude that merely 
because evidence was offered with regard to the values of certain 
pieces of property, that that evidence need automatically be 
taken as fact. It is the job of the trial court, after receiving 
all of that evidence, to carefully weigh the same and conclude, 
based upon that evidence, what the facts of the case are. That 
is exactly the procedure used by the trial court in this case and 
certainly should not be subject to attack, as Appellant has 
attempted to do in his brief. 
The parties in this case were married for approximately 
fifteen years. Each initially contributed about the same amount 
of money or property to the marriage and each worked and assumed 
the obligations of husband and wife during the relationship. 
There was no evidence before the court that Mr. Talley should be 
entitled to any more than one-half of what the parties had worked 
for during the relationship. Likewise, there was no evidence 
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that Respondent would be entitled to more than fifty per cent of 
the marital assets. Each side, in presenting its evidence, 
requested a fifty/fifty distribution (see Exhibits P-9 and D-3). 
Appellant, on several occasions during his testimony, admitted 
that all he was seeking was an equal distribution of the property 
(TR-116, 121, 139) . 
Now, for purposes of this appeal, Appellant has changed his 
position and concluded that he is entitled to more than fifty per 
cent and that the equal distribution of the marital property 
fashioned by the trial court is now not an equitable distribu-
tion. The basic flaw in Mr. Talleyfs approach is that he has not 
shown that there has been any misapplication of the law or any 
abuse of discretion which resulted in any inequity to him. 
Rather, he now complains that the trial court found that various 
items of personal and real property had values different than 
those attributed to that property by Appellant. In assigning 
those values, the trial court was only doing its job as the fact 
finder. 
When there is a discrepancy in testimony rendered by 
the witnesses, the fact-finder must decide which 
account is the most accurate. Then on appeal, we must 
review the facts in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party. Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah, 
1979). 
The question then becomes "was there credible evidence presented 
to the trial court to allow it to establish the values it did for 
the property in question?" The answer to that question is "yes.11 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S METHOD OF VALUING THE PROPERTY OF THE 
PARTIES WAS PROPER AND SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE, 
A. 
THERE WAS UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE AS TO THE VALUE OF 
APPELLANT'S RETIREMENT FUND. 
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in placing a 
value on his retirement fund. It is a fact that Appellant does 
have a retirement fund which had been contributed to for his 
benefit by his employer, Lone Star Construction. The fund 
continues to increase. He goes so far as to admit that this was 
an asset of the marriage (see Exhibit D-2) which is found in the 
Appendix to his Brief. The only question he had was "what was 
the value of this asset?" 
In order to establish that value, Respondent called Mr. Rob 
Roy, who was duly qualified and is an expert in the field of 
actuarial calculations. Mr. Roy concluded that that retirement 
fund, based on the figures provided to him by Mr. Talleyfs 
employer, had a present cash value of $30,040.93 (TR-74). 
Appellant, on cross-examination, attempted to challenge that 
valuation (TR-78); however, the expert's opinion did not change. 
Appellant offered no evidence of his own as to the value of that 
pension plan. In spite of Mr. Roy's unrefuted testimony, the 
trial court gave Appellant the benefit of the doubt in finding 
that its present value was only $15,000.00 when it could have 
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clearly and properly found that the present value of this marital 
asset was in excess of $30,000.00. 
Mr. Talley then argues that since the asset is not presently 
liquid and can only be utilized after his retirement, the trial 
court should not have handled it as it did. A similar argument, 
made by a dissatisfied husband, was rejected by this Court in 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah, 1982). In concluding 
that a retirement fund acquired during the marriage was a marital 
asset subject to equitable distribution, this Court stated: 
Whether that resource is subject to distribution does 
not turn on whether the spouse can presently use or 
control it, or on whether the resource can be given a 
present dollar value. The essential criterion is 
whether a right to the benefit or asset has accrued in 
whole or in part during the marriage. To the extent 
that the right has so accrued, it is subject to equit-
able distribution. 1x3. at 433. 
In this case there was uncontradicted expert evidence that the 
present value of that fund was $30,040.93. Mr. Talley also 
acknowledged that it was an inheritable asset (TR-96). The trial 
court then recognized that it would be six years before Mr. 
Talley could begin receiving the benefits associated with this 
asset and adjusted the value in half to compensate for the 
inability to have the immediate benefit of the funds. No error 
has been shown in the way the trial court valued and disposed of 
this asset and there was certainly sufficient evidence on which 
to make its finding. 
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B. 
THE VALUE OF THE PARTIES1 BOAT WAS SUPPORTED BY CRED-
IBLE EVIDENCE. 
Mrs. Talley admits there was a question of fact as to the 
value of the parties1 26-foot motor boat, trailer, and accessor-
ies. There was conflicting evidence on the value of this 
property. Respondent testified that she had heard her husband 
state that the value of the boat was $20,000.00. (TR-21). 
Appellant, without sufficient foundation, offered two business 
cards of third parties which contained notations as to what the 
individuals named on the cards thought the boat to be worth 
(Exhibit D-16). Those were received by the trial court over the 
properly made hearsay objections of Respondent. Perhaps, the 
most credible evidence presented to the trial court related to 
the boat's value was Mr. Talley's own statement when he was asked 
on cross-examination whether he would sell the boat for 
$11,500.00 and he quickly and succinctly stated that he would 
not. (TR-124). The fact of the matter is there was evidence 
before the trial court to allow it to find a value of the boat 
within the range of $11,500.00 to $20,000.00. The court consid-
ered the testimony of the parties and the fact that there was a 
trailer and accessories which accompanied the boat and found that 
the boat's fair market value was 516,000.00. Appellant has shown 
no error in connection with this valuation. 
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c. 
THE EXISTENCE AND VALUE OF THE PENNY STOCKS AND THE 
ESOP STOCKS WAS ESTABLISHED BY UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE. 
Appellant claimed there was no evidence related to the 
existence of the ESOP stock nor the value of various penny 
stocks. That is simply not the case. Appellant presented no 
evidence with regard to these assets; however, Respondent did. 
That evidence is reflected on Exhibits P6 and 9. (Exhibit P-9 is 
found in the Addendum to this Brief.) In connection with her 
testimony related to Exhibit P-6, Respondent was asked whether 
these stocks existed and she said they did and she was asked to 
state in her opinion the value of those stocks based upon current 
prices quoted from the same. She did that and no objection was 
made over the introduction of this evidence. Likewise, in 
Exhibit P-9, Respondent was asked about the existence and value 
of each asset of the marriage. One of those assets listed on 
that exhibit was the ESOP stock, which she believed to be worth 
$691.28. No objection was made to that exhibit, nor to her 
testimony. The only evidence before the trial court with regard 
to this property was the evidence provided by Respondent and the 
trial court in no way erred by accepting that evidence as fact. 
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D. 
THE VALUE OP THE HOME FURNISHINGS WAS ESTABLISHED BY 
EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY BOTH PARTIES, 
Like the value of the boat, each party testified as to what 
he or she thought the value of the home furnishings was and 
provided documentary evidence which was received without 
objection. Mr. Talley valued the home furnishings at $6,000.00 
and suggested that Respondent be awarded $5,000.00 of that 
property and that he receive $1,000.00 (TR-90). On the other 
hand, Mrs. Talley concluded that the worth of that property was 
$3,575.00 (TR-16, Exhibit P-9). The trial court weighed the 
exhibits and testimony and found that the value of this personal 
property was $3,500.00 and awarded the Respondent $3,000.00 of 
that sum and Appellant the remaining $500.00. The Respondent's 
china and Appellant's guns were not included in that personal 
property distribution and valuation and their disposition is 
discussed in Point F below. Like valuing the boat, the trial 
court reviewed the evidence and within the prerogatives granted 
to it determined what it felt to be the value of this property. 
No error has been shown. 
E. 
THE VARIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS OF BOTH PARTIES TO THE 
MARITAL HOME WERE FULLY CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Appellant claims that he should have received some type of 
reimbursement for an interest he claims he had in the marital 
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home prior to his marriage to Respondent. That claim flies in 
the face of the undisputed evidence that the fair market value of 
the home at the time of the marriage in 1968 was $17,650.00 
(TR-11, Exhibit P-l) and that the mortgage balance as of the date 
of marriage was $14,981.37 (TR-12). Utilizing those two figures, 
the most equity that could have existed as of the date of the 
marriage was approximately $2,700.00. Appellant failed to 
mention that during the course of the marriage Respondent's home 
which she brought into the marriage was sold and a profit of 
$6,600.00 was realized from that sale (TR-9). Mr. Talley admit-
ted that those proceeds were placed in a savings account and held 
until 1973, at which time they were used to pay off the entire 
mortgage balance then existing on the marital residence (TR-113, 
TR-115). On that basis alone, Respondent contributed' at least 
$3,000.00 more to the purchase of the marital residence. 
Appellant claimed that he had put approximately $3,000.00 
additional improvements into the marital residence (TR-87) and 
that evidence was also weighed and considered. The court then 
found as fact that based upon this testimony and the contribu-
tions each party had contributed an equal amount to the marital 
residence (R-163 and 178) . Such an approach is certainly not 
error and can in no way qualify as an abuse of discretion or 
misapplication of the law that must be shown in order to overturn 
a property distribution. 
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F. 
THE AWARD OF THE CHINA COLLECTION TO THE WIFE WAS 
OFFSET BY THE AWARD OF THE GUNS AND SPORTING GOODS TO 
THE HUSBAND. 
The award of the china collection to Respondent was offset 
by the trial courtfs award of the guns and sporting goods to 
Appellant. Appellant claims that there was testimony regarding 
the value of the china collection and that testimony consisted of 
what Appellant stated he had heard his wife say it was worth 
$5,000.00 (TR-99) . In Exhibit D-2 he then values it at 
$2,500.00. No evidence was offered as to the value of the guns 
and sporting goods, marital assets he could have erroneously 
concluded went to him automatically. 
It is difficult to look into the mind of the trial court in 
order to determine each and every reason for a certain property 
distribution, but it is certainly logical to conclude and clearly 
not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have decided 
that Respondent, being the wife of the parties, would be entitled 
to the china collection which she had acquired during the 
marriage, while Appellant, being the husband, would be more 
satisfied receiving the guns and sporting goods. Once again, in 
the final analysis, even as it relates to this minor issue, the 
trial court's concern over finding an equitable way to resolve 
this dispute is clearly evident by the property distribution 
itself. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT1S DECISION REGARDING ALIMONY WAS PROPER 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Appellant complains that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in awarding Respondent $250.00 per month alimony for two 
years and $150.00 per month alimony for an additional three years 
(R-185). Respondent had asked for $500.00 per month permanent 
alimony (TR-34). This was a fifteen-year marriage (R-176). She 
stated that the home was in need of substantial repairs (TR-31) 
and that her car needed repairs (TR-17). She netted $953.00 per 
month as a dispatcher and bookkeeper (TR-106) and he received 
$2,018.00 per month as a foreman for Lone Star Construction. Up 
to August 1984, he had earned $28,478.00 (Tr-64). In 1983 he 
earned $42,761.00 (TR-37, Exhibit P-13) while Mrs. Talley earned 
only $10,928.81 for that year (Exhibit P-12). Respondent esti-
mated her monthly expenses to be $1,320.00 (Exhibit P-8, TR-30). 
Mr. Talley presented no evidence as to his expenses and stated he 
had extra money to invest while this action was pending (TR-312). 
He also made substantial cash payments to his daughter after the 
parties' separation (TR-126, 129). 
The following comparison shows what income each will be 
receiving under the alimony award made by the trial court. 
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Mr. Talley Mrs. Talley 
Net monthly income 2,018.00 953.00 
Alimony award - 250.00 + 250.00 
Net disposable income 1,768.00 1,203.00 
(first 2 years) 
Net disposable income 1,868.00 1,103.00 
(last 3 years @ $150/month) 
Appellant has $565.00 more per month than Respondent on 
which to live. Respondents minimal monthly expenses certainly 
exceed the amount of income she has availaible to her from her 
employment and the court's alimony award. This Court stated, in 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah, 1980): 
The function of alimony is to provide support for the 
wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living 
she enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the wife 
from becoming a public charge. Id. at 1223. 
Even with this limited award of alimony it is unlikely she will 
be able to meet her day-to-day expenses and will be required to 
reduce her standard of living from the level she enjoyed while 
married to Appellant. He, on the other hand, admitted he had 
more money than he needed to cover expenses (TR-132). 
In his Brief, Appellant seems to interrelate the property 
settlement with the alimony award to support his claim that the 
alimony award was excessive. As this Court observed in English 
v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah, 1977): 
There is a distinction between the division of assets 
accumulated during the marriage which are distributed 
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on an equitable basis and the post-marital duty of 
support and maintenance. Icl. at 411. 
Mrs. Talley certainly is not going to live in the manner to 
which she was accustomed during the marriage any more than Mr. 
Talley. Unfortunatelyf that just happens to be one of the 
unavoidable realties of any divorce action. Neither party will 
have the standard of living he and she enjoyed when married. 
Mr. Talley also fails to mention the income tax advantage 
which will be received by him and the additional tax liability 
Mrs. Talley will incur because of the alimony she receives. 
The trial court, as it normally does, took a difficult 
situation and attempted to minimize the financial impact of the 
divorce on both parties. No abuse of discretion has been shown. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS JUSTI-
FIED AND CERTAINLY NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
A. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE WIFE 
IN AN AMOUNT LESS THAN HALF OF WHAT WAS REQUESTED WAS 
NOT ERROR AND WAS SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE. 
When this action was filed, Respondent requested that 
Appellant pay all of her attorney's fees and costs (R-3). 
Appellant answered and denied that she was entitled to attorney's 
fees (R-16). His Counterclaim was silent on the issue (R-17). 
At trial, Respondent stated she needed her attorney's fees paid 
(TR-40). Her income was half that of her husband (TR-12). The 
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trial court heard evidence from her counsel on attorney's fees 
and received into evidence a detailed and comprehensive computer 
print out which reflected all time and costs expended and 
described each task performed by her counsel (Exhibit P-18). 
Appellant gave no testimony as to fees nor did he choose to 
cross-examine Respondent's counsel (R-81). He further stipulated 
that Exhibit P-18 could be received (TR-80), as well as the 
proffer of testimony from her counsel. With that evidence before 
it, the trial court acted within its discretion and awarded 
Respondent attorney's fees and costs of $1,500.00. She had asked 
for $3,844.00 (TR-81). 
By stipulating to the admission of Exhibit P-18 in conjunc-
tion with proffered and received testimony of her counsel, and by 
not raising the objections he has now raised in this appeal, 
Appellant has, at the least, waived his right to claim that the 
trial court committed error on this issue. With the testimony of 
Mrs. Talley's counsel, the detailed time sheets received into 
evidence, the stipulation of Mr. Talley's counsel, the failure to 
object or cross-examine, and his general approval of the Findings 
and Decree, he now cannot claim that there was inadequate 
evidence on the issue of attorney's fees. 
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B. 
THE APPELLANT MAY NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF REASONABLENESS 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Appellant claims that the award of attorney1s fees was error 
because no evidence was presented as to the reasonableness of 
those fees. Respondent had asked for $3,844.00 fees and $136.00 
costs (TR-80). The court requested only a proffer, received all 
of the accounting information on those fees, and ultimately 
awarded less than half of that amount - $1,500.00 (R-187). 
Appellant did not object to the proffer. No objection was made 
during closing arguments. No objections to the Findings, Conclu-
sions, and Decree were made. In fact, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were approved as to form (R-183). No motion 
to amend or for new trial was made. 
This appeal is the first time those attorney's fees were 
ever questioned. "It is axiomatic that matters not presented to 
the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal." 
Franklin v. New Empire Financial Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 
(Utah, 1983). See, also, Shayne v. Stanley & Sons, Inc., 605 
P.2d 775 (Utah, 1980), and Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah, 
1977). Appellant's own actions in failing to call this claimed 
error to the attention of the trial court now preclude him from 
challenging that award, as he has attempted to do. 
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POINT V 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWAPD OF HER ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS APPEAL. 
No error has been shown to have been committed and Mr. 
Talley's appeal of the trial courtfs decision is without merit. 
When an appeal is shown to be without merit, the Respondent has 
the right to request this Court to award her attorney's fees 
associated with the appeal. As this Court properly concluded in 
Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah, 1978): 
However, the defendant argues that inasmuch as the 
plaintiff was unwilling to abide by the trial court's 
judgment, and that she has been put to the necessity of 
defending this appeal, the plaintiff should have to 
bear the costs thereof, including reasonable attorney's 
fees for her counsel. We agree with the reasonableness 
and propriety of her request. Tfootnote] ][d. at 906. 
See, also, Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 (Utahf 1977). 
Here Respondent does not have substantial assets and has a 
limited net income of $953.00 per month (TR-12, 105). On the 
other hand, Appellant nets at least $2,018.00 per month (TR-105) 
and has funds remaining after his expenses to make investments 
(TR-132). Fairness requires that Respondent not be required to 
deplete her limited assets in demonstrating that this appeal is 
without merit. She requests this Court to remand to the trial 
court for determination an award of her attorney's fees and costs 
associated with this appeal. 
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant has not raised any issues on appeal about which he 
can show there has been a misapplication of the law or an abuse 
of discretion resulting from a substantial error or a serious 
inequity by the trial court. The trial court's method of valuing 
the property of the parties was proper and was supported by 
substantial evidence and testimony presented at trial, including 
expert testimony. The trial court judge took all proffered 
testimony and evidence, placed a reasonable value on each piece 
of personal property, and fashioned a property distribution and 
support award that would be as fair as possible to both parties. 
Based on the length of the marriage and the income disparity 
of the parties, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding Respondent a limited amount of alimony for a limited 
period of time. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding to Respondent $1,500.00 in attorney's fees. Appellant 
did not raise the issue of reasonableness of attorney's fees at 
the trial court level. What Appellant did not challenge before 
the trial court cannot now be raised on appeal. 
Because Appellant's arguments on appeal are without merit 
and the trial court acted well within its discretion in all 
matters pertaining to the trial of this matter, Respondent should 
be awarded her attorney's fees and costs associated with this 
appeal. 
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The decision of the trial court should be affirmed in all 
respects and the matter remanded for a determination of Respon-
dent's attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this /& day of April 1985. 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING S/LIAPIS 
Kent M. Kastifrg 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
above and foregoing Respondent's Brief were duly mailed by 
placing the same in the United States Mails, postage prepaid, at 
Salt Lake City, Utah, addressed to: 
Stephen A. Van Dyke, Esq. 
Bean & Smedley 
Suite 2 
190 South Fort Lane 
Layton, Utah 84041 
DATED this /£ day of April 1985. 
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ADDENDUM 
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Assets of the Parties 
Home ($64,500 appraisal) 
$2,500.00 equity to H 
$6,600.00 reimbursed to W 
1980 Thunderbird 
1982 Ford Pickup and Camper Shell 
1971 Honda 90 Motorcycle 
1975 Honda XL Motorcycle 
Furniture & Furnishings 
Utah Bank & Trust (checking) - H 
Utah Bank & Trust (savings) - J 
Tracy Collins (checking) - W 
Boat - J 
Stocks 
IRA - First Interstate - W 
IRA - United Bank - H (3 accounts) 
Silver - 500 oz. ($6.00/oz.) 
ESOP - H 
31.422 shares ($22.00/share) 
Portland Cement Profit Sharing - H 
(as of July 31, 1984) 
Merrill Lynch Share Builder 
442.0598 shares 
TOTAL 
$173,665.82 -, 2 = $86,832.91 
Pension and Retirement - W 
Grand Total 
* As of December 7, 1983 
** As of September 30, 1983 
Decmeber 21, 1983. 
$55,400.00 
2,500.00 
7,000.00 
250.00 
400.00 
3,575.00 
6,395.06* 
20,445.84** 
250.00 
20,000.00 
1,236.50 
9,250.02 
7,114.58 
3,000.00 
691.28 
27,426.86 
8,730.68 
$173,665.82 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
7 3mi -xv—! 
Husband withdrew $6,000.00 on 
Division of Assets 
Wife 
Home 
1980 Thunderbi 
1971 Honda 90 
Furniture & 
Furnishings 
Tracy Collins 
(checking) 
rd 
IRA - First Inter-
state 
Sub-total 
Cash 
TOTAL 
</>
• 
+ 
$ 
55,400.00 
2,500.00 
250.00 
3,075.00 
250.00 
9,250.02 
70,725.02 
16,107.89 
86,832.91 
Husband 
1982 Ford pickup 
1975 Honda XL 
Utah Bank & Trust 
(checking) 
Utah Bank & Trust 
(savings) 
Boat 
Stocks 
IRA 
Silver 
Furniture & Furn-
ishings 
ESOP 
$ 7,000.00 
400.00 
6,395.06 
20,445.84 
20,000.00 
1,236.50 
7,114.58 
3,000.00 
500.00 
691.28 
Portland Cement profit-
sharing account 27,426.86 
Merrill Lynch 
Share Builder 
Sub-total 
TOTAL 
Plaintiff to be awarded $500.00 per month in alimony. 
8,730.68 
$102,940.80 
- 16,107.89 
86,832.91 
Defendant to be ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $2,500.00 
in attorney's fees. 
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IN THE DISTRIC COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DY 33D-
DEPUTY CL^A 
DONNA S. TALLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GLEN S. TALLEY, 
Defendant. 
Civil Action No. 34879 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This matter came before tbe Court for hearing on the 27th day 
of August, 1984. Plaintiff was present and represented by attorney 
Paul Liapis. Defendant was present and represented by Stanley M. 
Smedley. The Court heard the testimony of the witnesses and the 
evidence profered by the parties and being fully advised in the 
premises makes its Memordandum Decision as follows: 
1. That the Court has jurisdiction. 
2. That each of the parties should be granted a decree of 
divorce from the other based upon mental cruelty, to become final 
upon entry. 
3. That the Court finds that the equity which defendant had in 
the home at the time of the marriage was approximately equal to the 
amount of cash subsequently contributed by the plaintiff and there-
fore that the parties have equal value in the home. 
4. The home of the parties is awarded to the plaintiff free 
and clear of any claim of the defendant and the Court values the 
home at $65,000.00. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded the vehicle in her possession and the 
Honda 90 and the Court finds that they are worth $4,200.00 and $250.00 
respectively. 
6. Plaintiff is awarded the furniture and fixtures in the home 
with the exception of those items listed in Defendant's exhibit 7, 
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Talley vs. Talley 
excluding therefrom the lawn mower and fertilizer spreader which 
is awarded to the plaintiff. The Court finds the items awarded 
to the plaintiff have a value of approximately $3,000.00 and those 
awarded to the defendant approximately $50 0.00. 
7. Each of the parties are awarded their personal property 
and possessions and defendant is awarded his sports equipment. 
8. That the plaintiff is awarded the food storage and freezer 
items and Court values them at approximately $600.00. 
9. Court awards to the defendant the truck and Honda 250, 
having a value of approximately $6,550.00 and $400.00 respectively. 
10. Defendant is to be awarded the 1978 Fiberform boat, to-
gether with accessories and the Court finds that the value thereof 
is approximately $16,600.00. 
11. That defendant is awarded those items of furniture and 
miscellaneous proeprty listed in defendant's exhibit 7 with the 
exception of the lawn mower and the fertilizer spreader which is 
awarded to the plaintiff. 
12. That the defendant is awarded the parties interest in the 
Portland Cement Profit Sharing valued at $27,196.00 and in the Lone 
Star stock, valued at $8,700.00. 
13. Each of the parties is awarded their IRA accounts. 
14. Defendant is awarded the penny stock worth approximately 
$1,236.00. 
15. Court finds that the retirement of the defendant is vested 
and that the actual value is difficult to determine because it is 
contingent upon the number of years that defendant would live follow-
ing retirement. For that reason Court values it at $15,000.00 and 
awards any interest therein to the defendant. 
16. The Court awards the silver to the defendant and values it 
at $3,000.00. 
17. That the defendant is awarded the ESOP stock and Court 
values it a t $690.00. 
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18. The Court awards to the plaintiff no interest in the 
defendant's life insurance. 
19. As to the savings accounts of the parties Court finds 
that $2,000.00 of that amount consists of tax reserve and awardes 
the same to the defendant. The Court finds that approximately 
$4,000.00 was used to purchase the silver and that silver now has 
a value of $3,000.00 which has been awarded to the defendant. The 
balance of $14,000.00 from savings is awarded $8,750.00 to the 
plaintiff and $5,250.00 to the defendant which brings the amount 
awarded to the parties as equal as the Court is able to do with 
the circumstances. 
20. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and discharge the debt 
to Sears and to Allmans and any other debt which she has incurred 
since the date of separation and to hold defendant harmless thereon. 
21. That defendant is ordered to assume and discharge any 
debt which he has incurred since the date of separation and to hold 
the plaintiff harmless thereon. 
22. Defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff the sum «of 
$250.00 per month as and for alimony for a period of two years 
after which said alimony is reduced to the amount of $150.00 per 
month, said alimony to terminate at the end of said five year 
period or upon plaintiff's remarriage or as provided by law, which 
ever occurs first. 
23. Each of the parties is awarded any sums in their respective 
checking accounts. 
24. Each of the parties is awarded the furniture and fixtures 
that they brought into the marriage with the exception of the items 
which have been given to the children previously. 
25. Defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, for the use 
and benefit of her attorney, the sum of $1,500.00. 
26. Plaintif's attorney is ordered to draft the Findings and 
Decree and submit to opposing counsel for approval before forwarding 
to the Court for signature. 
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DATED this 4th day of September, 1984. 
1& 
RODNEY S./PXGE ~~ f 
Districts^Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of September, 1984 I 
mailed a copy of the Memorandum Decision to Paul H. Liapis, 
counsel for the plaintiff, 48 P.O. Place, New York Life Bldg, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101 and to Stanley M. Smedley, attorney 
for the defendant, 190 South Fort Lane, Layton, Utah, 84041, 
postage pre paid. 
MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN, Clerk of Court 
By da^gy 6*«l^ 
/IT ' Deputy Clerk 
PAUL H. LIAPIS - 1956 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 532-6996 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DONNA S. TALLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
GLEN S. TALLEY, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 34879 
ooOoo 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 27th 
day of August, 1984, before the Honorable Rodney S. Page, one of 
the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff appearing in 
person and by and through her attorney, Paul H. Liapis, and 
Defendant appearing in person and by and through his attorney, 
Stanley M. Smedley, and the parties and other witnesses having 
been duly sworn and examined under oath, and documentary evidence 
having been marked and received by the Court, and more than three 
(3) months having elapsed since the filing of Plaintiff's 
Complaint, and the Court having heard the arguments of counsel 
for Plaintiff and Defendant and having inquired into the legal 
sufficiency of the evidence so adduced, and being fully advised 
in the premises, does now make, adopt and find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was a bona fide and actual resident of Davis 
County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months immediately 
prior to the filing of the Complaint herein. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, having 
been married on June 14, 1968, in Bountiful, Utah, and having 
separated in December, 1983. 
3. Two children have been born as issue of this marriage, 
namely, Kelly, now age 22, and Teresa Ann, now age 27. 
4. On numerous occasions prior to the filing of 
Plaintiff's Complaint herein, Defendant treated Plaintiff 
cruelly, causing great mental distress and suffering, in that, 
among other things, Defendant has constantly threatened Plaintiff 
and the children with violence, has caused numerous arguments 
over small inconsequential matters, and has failed to meet the 
needs of the Plaintiff as a woman, wife and mother, all of which 
has destroyed the feelings of love and affection once held by 
Plaintiff for Defendant, causing this marriage to exist in name 
only. 
5. On numerous occasions prior to the filing of 
Plaintiff's Complaint herein, Plaintiff treated Defendant 
cruelly, causing great mental distress and suffering, in that, 
among other things, Plaintiff's child from a prior marriage has 
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caused inconvenience and annoyance to the Defendant, has refused 
to leave the home after he has attained his age of majority, and 
Plaintiff has put her children before the Defendant, all of which 
has destroyed the feelings of love and affection once held by 
Defendant for Plaintiff, causing this marriage to exist in name 
only. 
6. The Court finds from the testimony of Plaintiff and 
Defendant that the parties have been separated for a long time 
with no minor children, that all of the efforts at reconciliation 
have failed, that there is no good or useful purpose that would 
be served in prolonging this marriage, and that a Decree of 
Divorce should be entered and the same should become upon final 
signing and entry. 
7. The Court finds that the parties, during the course of 
their marriage, have acquired the following personal property: 
1971 Honda motorcycle $ 250.00 
1980 Thunderbird 4,200.00 
Furniture, furnishings, fixtures 
and appliances in the family home 
and lawn mower and fertilizer spreader 3,000.00 
Furniture items with the Defendant 
and/or hereby awarded to Defendant 
as per his Exhibit 7-D 500.00 
Freezer and food storage 600.00 
1982 Ford pickup and camper shell 6,550.00 
1975 Honda XL motorcycle 400.00 
1978 Fiberform boat, together with accessories 16,600.00 
/ 
Defendant's interest in his Portland Cement 
profit sharing plan 
Defendant's interest in Lone Star stock 
First Interstate IRA (W) 
United Bank IRA (H) (three accounts) 
Penny stocks 
Defendant's retirement account 
500 ounces silver 
ESOP stock plan 
Utah Bank & Trust savings account 
Tracy Collins checking account (W) 
Utah Bank & Trust checking account (H) 
27,196.00 
8,700.00 
9,250.02 
7,114.58 
1,236.00 
15,000.00 
3,000.00 
690.00 
16,000.00 
250.00 
200.00 
8. The Court further finds that the Defendant prior to 
this marriage acquired a home located at 1163 South 350 West, 
Bountiful, Utah. The Court also finds that at the time Plaintiff 
moved into the home, she contributed from proceeds received from 
the sale of the home she owned prior to the marriage the sum of 
$6,600.00 and that each party, therefore, owns an equal interest 
in this home. The Court further finds the home to be valued at 
$65,000.00 by stipulation of the parties, with no mortgage or 
encumbrance against the property. 
9. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is presently 
employed by Flower Aviation with a net income of $922.28 per 
month. 
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10. The Court finds from the testimony of Ashby S. Decker 
that the Defendant is presently employed by Lone Star Industries 
with a gross income through the 15th of August, 1984, of 
$28,478,00. 
11. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has present 
obligations outstanding to Sears in the sum of $66.00 and 
Allman's Carpets in the sum of $66.00. The Court finds that the 
Defendant has indicated no outstanding debts and obligations. 
12. The Court finds that Plaintiff has incurred attorney's 
fees in connection with this matter. 
13. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has no interest in 
the Defendant's life insurance policies. 
14. With regard to the Defendant's retirement account, the 
Court finds that said account is vested and that the actual value 
is difficult to determine because it is contingent upon the 
number of years that the Defendant would live on retirement. The 
Court further finds that the Plaintiff's actuarial expert, Ronald 
N. Roy, has placed a value of said retirement account at 
$30,040.93. The Court finds the reasonable value of said account 
to be $15,000.00. 
15. Specifically with regard to the $20,000.00 savings 
account held by the parties with Tracy Collins Bank, the Court 
finds that $2,000.00 of said amount consists of tax reserves 
maintained by the Defendant. The Court further finds that 
approximately $4,000.00 of said account was used to purchase the 
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500 ounces of silver, which the Court has valued above at 
$3,000.00. 
16. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is in need of 
additional support from the Defendant for a period of five (5) 
years. 
17. The Court finds that each of the parties should be 
awarded the furniture and fixtures which they brought into the 
marriage, with the exception of those items which were given to 
the children previously. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
adopts its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from each other upon the grounds of mental cruelty, with 
said Decree to become final upon signing and entry. 
3. The home of the parties located at 1163 South 350 West 
Bountiful, Utah, is hereby awarded to the Plaintiff, DONNA S. 
TALLEY, as her sole and separate property, free and clear of any 
interest of the Defendant. 
4. Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of 
$250.00 per month as alimony for a period of two (2) years, after 
which, said alimony is to be reduced to the sum of $150.00 per 
month for a period of three (3) additional years, with said 
alimony then to cease at the termination of the five-year period 
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or upon Plaintiff's remarriage or as provided by law, whichever 
occurs first. 
6. Defendant is awarded as his sole and separate property 
the 1982 Ford pickup truck and camper shell, the 1975 Honda XL 
motorcycle, his Utah Bank & Trust checking account, the $7,250.00 
from the parties' Utah Bank & Trust savings account (which 
includes the $2,000.00 awarded Defendant for tax reserves), the 
1978 Fiberform boat with accessories, his IRA accounts, the 500 
ounces of silver, the Defendant's ESOP plan, the Defendant's 
Portland Cement profit sharing plan, Defendant's retirement 
account, Defendant's Merrill Lynch Lone Star stock plan, the 
furniture in Defendant's possession defined as bedroom set, gun 
cabinet, 300 Savage rifle, 12-gauge shotgun, 22 Browning rifle, 
22 Colt revolver, X-70 camera, G.E. tape recorder, binoculars, 
Honda 500 watt generator, McCullough chain saw, battery charger, 
3/8 inch hand drill, 1/2 inch hand drill, vibrating sander, 2 
coleman stoves, 2 coolers (red and blue), suitcase, Toro 7-24 
snow blower, car stands, new RCA television, couch which makes 
into a bed, globe on stand, his sports equipment, the penny 
stocks with Tintic Mining, Classic Mining, Modern Minerals, 
Midnight Gold and Silver, Gyro, Stansbury and Airlift 
International, and his personal effects and belongings. 
7. Plaintiff is awarded as her sole and separate property 
the 1980 Thunderbird, the 1971 Honda 90 motorcycle, all the 
remaining furniture, furnishings, fixtures and appliances, 
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including the lawn mower and fertilizer spreader, the freezer and 
food storage, her Tracy Collins checking account, her First 
Interstate IRA account, $8,750.00 of the parties1 Utah Bank & 
Trust savings account, and her personal effects and belongings. 
8. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay and hold the 
Defendant harmless therefrom the following obligations: The 
accounts with Sears and Allman's Carpets. 
9. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay and hold the 
Plaintiff harmless from any debts or obligations incurred by him 
since the date of separation up to the present time. 
10. The Defendant is hereby awarded all interest he holds 
in his life insurance policies to do with as he chooses. 
14. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant in 
the sum of $1,500,00 for attorney's fees in this matter. 
15. The parties are each awarded the items of furniture and 
fixtures which they brought into the marriage, with the exception 
of those items which have been given away by the parties to their 
children, and that position is ratified by the Court. 
16. The parties are ordered to execute any and all 
documents necessary to carry forth the intent of this order. 
DATED this /l/^day of ectobor, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
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APPPOVED AS TO FORM: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to Stanley M. Smedley, Esq., Layton Professional 
Center, 190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2, Layton, Utah 84041, this 
s - day of October, 1984. 
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